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Introduction
The paper deals with the comparison of two major ways to increase consumers’ reassurance about the 
safety of food: interpersonal trust and 
expert systems of quality control based 
on standards. We will first present the 
growing concern of consumers for food 
safety in general and in Southeast Asia 
more particularly. We will then review 
the literature on interpersonal trust 
and expert systems as quality assurance 
devices with their respective strengths 
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In Asia, the growth of purchasing power, especially in cities, come together with 
rising consumers’ concerns for food safety. We investigate two mechanisms 
of food safety assurance, i.e., proximity (between farmers and consumers), 
and certification based on standards. The literature suggests the following 
hypotheses: (i) proximity in food chains comes together with low farmers’ cost 
for quality assurance, but also limited scope of operation; and (ii) “abstract” 
expertise systems that form the basis of standardization imply high costs 
at the expense of inclusion of small-scale farmers, but enable large scope of 
operation; the impact on consumers’ trust is controversial. The paper is 
a preliminary attempt to test these hypotheses on the situation of vegetable 
safety assurance in Northern Vietnam. The authors’ fieldwork brings to the 
fore a variety of standards and quality assurance systems: safe vegetable 
certification by the Plant Protection Department, based on—quite lax—
public standards and control; it is in some cases supplemented by internal 
control systems; VietGap and AseanGaps based on good agricultural practices 
and HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point); and participatory 
guarantee systems (PGSs) for organic vegetables. The hypotheses are partly 
confirmed. One interesting outcome relates to the combination of systems 
based on relational proximity, expert systems, and labeling on the origin of 
vegetables as enhancing consumers’ trust and farmers’ commitments. The 
paper concludes with recommendations in terms of policy and research. 
Keywords: Food safety assurance, standards, proximity, vegetables, Vietnam
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of weaknesses. Illustrations taken from 
the authors’ work in Vietnam, and also 
on some secondary sources, will then 
be presented. The authors’ experience is 
based on the study of domestic rather 
than export markets, and on vegetables 
rather than other commodities. The 
paper concludes with a summary of the 
main issues and some recommendations 
in terms of research. 
Growing concern for food safety
Globally
The growing distrust of consumers in the safety of food is widely documented in both developed 
and transitional economies. This is 
related to the growing intensification (in 
terms of use of chemical inputs) or even 
industrialization of food production and 
processing, as well as to the growing 
distances between food production and 
food consumption sites. 
 As stated by Ménard and 
Valceschini (2005), “recent developments 
have encouraged consumers to adopt 
a ‘suspicious approach’.” Technological 
innovations, combined with the 
diversity of product origins and the 
internationalization of trade, stimulate 
consumers’ risk aversion, which has 
been exacerbated by recent events such 
as “mad cow” disease, the poultry flu 
pandemic, etc. (p. 427). “The costs and 
efficiency of alternative organizational 
and institutional answers in establishing 
credible commitments are at stake” (p. 
428).
 In Europe, food crises have 
been especially acute in the meat sector 
since the 1990s. Bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) struck in 1996, 
followed by the dioxin crisis in Belgium 
in 1999. Avian influenza started in Hong 
Kong and then moved to inland China and 
Vietnam in 2005. The response to food 
scares is a drop in food consumption, and 
recovery is always incomplete (Böcker 
and Hanf 2000). After the second crisis of 
BSE in 1999, three years were necessary 
for consumption to reach its previous 
level, despite very low real risk. Industrial 
production, as well as information 
brought to light by scientific experts, 
was made invalid by BSE (Allaire 2005). 
Organic agriculture is not spared from 
stigmatization. In 2011, Escherichiacoli 
that developed from germinated seeds 
produced in an organic farm caused 
the death of 38 people in Germany. The 
origin of the bacteria had been wrongly 
attributed to Spanish cucumbers by 
German food safety authorities, which 
led to more than 500 million euros in 
losses due to the drop in consumption 
(Wollman and Briat 2011). In 2003, Korea 
banned beef imports from the United 
States because of BSE. In early 2006, 
Korea and the United States resumed an 
import protocol. This resulted in what 
was considered as one of the biggest 
anti-government demonstrations in two 
decades.
 Although it is less characterized 
by “de-territorialization” than other 
sectors, agriculture is being increasingly 
driven by international food chains. 
Internationalization and concentration 
are observed in the sector of agricultural 
inputs as well as retailing. These processes 
started to be documented in the 1990s 
(Goodman and Watts 1997; Morgan, 
Marsden, and Murdoch 2006). According 
to Friedmann (1994, 272), the dominant 
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tendency in agriculture as well as diets 
is “the suppression of particularities of 
time and place” and the disconnection of 
production and consumption.
 The massive protests following 
beef imports suspected of BSE in Korea 
in 2008 are partly due to distrust in the 
behavior of retailers, some of whom 
were selling American beef as domestic 
beef. Due to the growing gap between 
producers and consumers, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for consumers 
to understand the way food has been 
produced. “Both the physical distance 
and the mental distance between 
producers and consumers have grown” 
(Brom 2000, 129). In the UK, publication 
in 2002 of the Curry Report demanding to 
reconnect production and consumption 
of food indicates a milestone in policy 
development (Wiskerke 2003).
 The increasing marketing power 
of modern distribution is having mixed 
effects on these food safety problems. 
What is especially affected by food 
crises is consumer trust in the reliability 
of suppliers (Böcker and Hanf 2000). 
Food crises are commonly followed 
by strategies of differentiation through 
quality for all actors in food chains 
(Ménard and Valceschini 2005). On 
the one hand, promotion of food safety 
is a key communication strategy of 
supermarkets; thus, consumers associate 
purchases in supermarkets with enhanced 
quality assurance. On the other hand, 
these perceptions are not necessarily 
paralleled with genuine efforts on the 
part of modern distribution. Besides, 
consumers are made increasingly 
dependent on the information provided 
by a small number of retailers (Ménard 
and Valceschini 2005).
In Asia
 In Asia, some authors consider 
that concern for food safety has emerged 
since food availability is no longer a 
concern (Changchui 2006). Sources of 
food contamination have also increased. 
This is because of the increase in industrial 
and domestic sources of pollution close 
to agricultural production areas, and also 
because of the rise in the use of chemical 
inputs by farmers. In China, consumers’ 
concerns include pesticides, heavy 
metals, and growth hormones contained 
in produce, as well as contamination from 
water and soil (Wei 2006). This is close to 
the concerns of Vietnamese consumers, 
who worry first about pesticide 
contamination in fruits and vegetables 
followed by antibiotics in meat (Figuié et 
al. 2004). In the Philippines, consumers 
are concerned first about the physical 
appearance of fruits and vegetables, 
followed by pesticide residues (Battet al. 
2006).
 With increased facility for 
regional trade, there are also new worries 
about food safety. As highlighted by 
a meeting of consumer protection 
associations in 2005, the benefits 
of economic integration are mostly 
discussed from the point of view of 
businesses rather than that of consumers 
(Consumers International 2005).
 The rapid development of 
supermarkets in both developed and 
developing countries has been covered 
extensively in reports in the last decade, 
particularly by Reardon et al. (2003). In 
Asia, the first supermarkets emerged in 
the 1990s after their rapid development 
in Latin America. The westernization 
of Asian diets, the development of 
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supermarkets, fast-food chains, and 
exports in Asian countries are described 
by Pingali (2006) as the main drivers 
for change in the food systems. Private 
standards are developed by supermarkets 
as substitutes for nonexistent or 
inadequate public standards (Reardon, 
Timmer, and Berdégué 2008). 
 The following section investigates 
some literature insights on what are the 
ways for suppliers to answer consumers’ 
concerns about food safety.
Literature insights on food safety 
assurance systems
Food safety refers to credence attributes, i.e., attributes not directly observable by the user, which create 
the most uncertainty concerning quality 
(Darby and Karni 1973), relative to search 
and experience attributes (Nelson 1970). 
Credence attributes generate information 
asymmetries between farmers and 
consumers, which cannot be entirely dealt 
with by trust and reputation, in contrast 
to experience attributes (Caswell and 
Modjuska 1996). Labeling commodities 
with some mandatory information on 
the production processes is an answer to 
these issues. Monitoring by consumers 
or experts paid by consumers is another 
option (Darby and Karni 1973). The 
credibility of labeling is strengthened by 
third-party certification, which implies 
standardization and testing (Bonroy 
and Constantatos 2008). In addition to 
the literature on labels and standards 
as answers to food safety problems, 
there is growing documentation 
of ”reconnection” or proximity of 
agriculture with food consumption as 
ways to reassure consumers in terms of 
food safety. In what follows, we present 
what is stated to be the advantages and 
limits of two mechanisms of quality 
assurance: proximity between farmers 
and consumers, and standards. 
In Asia
a. Definitions
 In the literature, proximity 
between producers and consumers—
be it geographical or relational (the 
two being partially related)—is said 
to be advantageous to transactions in 
various respects. Geographical or spatial 
proximity relates to the “kilometric 
distance that separates two units” 
(Torre and Rallett 2005, 49). Relational 
proximity—equivalent to organized 
proximity according to Torre (2000)—
relates to the interactions between 
stakeholders. It has also been defined as 
a mutual alignment of interests based 
on combinations of power relations, 
trust, and management of social factors 
(Murphy 2012). It is said to rest on 
common representations and values 
(termed as cognitive proximity by Bouba-
Olga and Grossetti (2008)), a capital of 
trust and interpersonal relations.
b. The advantages of geographical proximity
 The role of geographical proximity 
in the supply of perishable crops was 
modelled by Von Thünen in the first 
analysis of agricultural land use according 
to location done in 1826 (Huriot 1994). 
According to Von Thünen’s model, land is 
allocated according to the use which brings 
the highest land rent, and can be sketched 
as concentric circles relative to the city 
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center. Land rent is defined as the share 
of the output by area after deduction of 
production and transport costs. The most 
profitable and intensive land use by unit 
area, and commodities with high value 
relative to transport costs, are found near 
the city center. This is typically the case 
for perishable fruits and vegetables. The 
validity of von Thünen’s model is being 
brought back into question in industrial 
societies where the share of transport cost 
in the total cost decreases, and dominant 
factors in the locating of production are 
soil quality, regional specialization, and 
competition between agriculture and 
urban development (Huriot 1994).
c. The advantages of relational proximity
 Geographical proximity goes 
hand in hand with relational proximity, 
as it may favor more direct links between 
producers and consumers. Such direct 
links are efficient in the development of 
trust and loyalty, as well as some sense of 
responsibility on the part of farmers as 
regards food safety (Prigent-Simonin and 
Hérault-Fournier 2005). According to 
Ellis and Sumberg (1998), the advantages 
in terms of quality gained by proximity 
between suppliers and customers—in 
particular trust—may be a transient 
consequence of quality regulations not 
being adequately enforced. But they 
may also be considered as an efficient 
substitute for costly and difficult public 
control of food safety in the context of 
small-scale agriculture.
 Personalized relationships in 
market transactions play the role of 
minimizing transaction costs (Porath 
1980). The role of vertical integration in 
reducing transaction costs was brought 
to the fore by Williamson (1987). 
Transaction costs means all indirect costs 
incurred in setting up, conducting, and 
monitoring the transaction, i.e., the cost 
of searching out, selecting, agreeing to, 
implementing, and enforcing contracts 
(North 1990). Measurement costs 
of quality characteristics are specific 
types of transaction costs. The safety of 
food produce is a quality attribute that 
is especially difficult to observe and 
measure. The consequences of quality 
measurement constraints on the supply 
of low-quality produce (as good quality 
produce does not get a quality premium) 
and even disappearance of market 
transactions have been demonstrated 
by Akerlov (1970). Increased vertical 
integration is a response to a greater 
number of quality measurement errors 
(Barzel 1982). Transaction costs relate 
here to establishing mutual views about 
honesty, reliability, and skill, as well as rules 
and norms concerning contingencies. On 
the other hand, drawing from the game 
theory, the expectation of continuing 
exchange may provide a disincentive 
to cheat: the infinite repetition of a 
transaction can induce the parties to 
give up short-term benefits in order 
to realize future gains (Platteau 1994). 
Personalized relationships, which can 
also be termed as relational governance, 
are an intermediary mode between 
the two polar extremes of governance 
(Claro, Hagelaar, and Omta2003), 
market and hierarchy (Williamson 
1991). Trust reflects the extent to which 
negotiations are fair and commitments 
are sustained (Anderson and Narus 
1984). Trust counterbalances the need 
for a costly safeguard mechanism against 
opportunism. Trust (inter-personal as 
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well as inter-organizational) favors two 
aspects of relational governance, joint 
planning, and joint problem solving 
(Claro, Hagelaar, and Omta 2003). Trust 
refers to the credibility (or reliability) 
of the partner, as well as to his/her 
benevolence. It is based on familiarity 
“developed either from previous 
interactions or derived from membership 
in similar social groups” (Battet al. 
2006, 94). Personal relationships are 
at the same time an antecedent and a 
consequence of transactions as they are 
“continually assessed and reassessed with 
each subsequent exchange transaction” 
(ibid.96)
 Direct sales from farmers to 
consumers take various forms in terms 
of location and method of transaction, 
including farmers’ markets, home-to-
home delivery, and at-farm purchases 
(Cadilhon 2007). Community-supported 
agriculture (CSA) emerged in the mid-
1960s, approximately at the same time in 
Japan and Germany, mostly in reaction to 
food industry scandals (Roos,Terragni, 
and Torjusen 2007). In CSA, consumers 
agree to prepay a certain amount of 
money to the producers, or to invest 
in the production system directly, in 
exchange for receiving fresh produce at 
their door or at a designated delivery 
station during the harvest season. 
 Direct sales reduce marketing 
risks for both sides: risks for farmers 
of not finding buyers, and risks for 
customers of not finding the suppliers 
they are looking for. These risks are 
especially important in the case of 
perishable produce. Consumers may also 
expect quality characteristics that are 
difficult to visibly observe, such as nonuse 
of pesticides and cleanliness during 
processing and packaging. The building 
of regular, personal relationships, based 
on the seller’s reputation and buyer’s 
trust, can be termed as a “domestic 
convention,” enabling consumers to 
feel more reassured—in contrast with 
standards which refer to industrial 
conventions (Eymard-Duvernay 1989). 
The farmer–producer relationship is 
an opportunity to exchange knowledge 
on production methods, which fulfills 
the consumer’s needs for reassurance, 
because producers are perceived as the 
most competent persons to give this 
information. In return, direct farmer–
consumer exchanges enable farmers to 
have a better appreciation of consumer 
demands (Prigent-Simonin and Hérault-
Fournier 2005).
 Direct sales have also been 
described as a way to develop solidarity 
between farmers and consumers. 
Numerous advocates of “alternative 
distribution food chains” claim that 
citizens should be able to access local 
neighborhood small-scale retail points—
if possible, run directly by farmers—
rather than mass-scale, monopolistic 
and production-centered distribution, 
which disconnects agricultural output 
from its natural conditions of production 
(Morgan, Marsden, and Murdoch 2006; 
Friedmann 1994). Kirwan (2004) refers to 
social connectivity, reciprocity, and trust 
as dominant drivers of British consumers 
buying from farmers’ markets. “Forums 
where producers and consumers can 
come together to solidify bonds of 
community” (Lyson 2000) define civic 
agriculture, where producers are not 
only responding to wants expressed by 
consumers, but also share the sense of 
inhabiting the same place with resulting 
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joint opportunities as well as constraints 
and responsibilities (DeLind 2002). 
According to Hinrichs (2000), it is not 
necessarily easy to disaggregate the 
market interests gained by farmers and 
consumers through direct transactions, 
from more social and civic interests, as 
all are embedded.
 In France, it is noted that 
producers in short chains choose 
practices that are meaningful with 
regard to the environment, allowing 
them to communicate more easily and 
that they can turn to greater advantage 
in their direct relationship with the 
consumer, such as diversification of fruit 
and vegetable varieties. In Britany, the 
proportion of organic farmers among 
producers selling to consumers is 
reportedly 30% compared to 15% for at-
farm sales (Redlingshöfer 2008).
 Finally, when the place of food 
production is close to where the food is 
consumed, farmers face more directly 
the recipients of the shaded health and 
environmental costs (i.e., externalities) 
of their actions. The consequences of 
unsustainable production will be more 
“visible” and easy to sanction by local 
institutions (Princen 1997).
d. The limits of proximity and the 
advantages of standards
 Mostly by definition, there is a 
geographical limit to the efficiency of 
face-to-face interactions, even when it 
is supplemented by organized proximity, 
modern technologies of communication, 
and temporary geographical proximity 
at crucial stages of the transaction or 
innovation processes (Torre and Rallett 
2005). Direct sales are commonly 
associated with niche markets, i.e., for 
organic markets. Achieving success 
stories in terms of quality management, 
farmer, and intra-chain coordination 
for local produce (i.e., with geographical 
indications), without damaging the inter-
personal relationships and commitments 
which guarantee long-term efforts in 
terms of quality, remains a challenge for 
many. In the European-funded project 
SUSCHAIN which worked in seven 
European countries (two cases per 
country) (Wiskerke 2003), it is stated 
that a small “sustainability” gain within 
the 95% (normalized and concentrated 
markets) may have a larger overall impact 
than a larger “sustainability” gain within 
the 5% (typified by producer cooperation 
and more direct interactions).
 As mentioned above, the 
literature on labels indicates that 
credence attributes generate information 
asymmetries and suppliers’ risks of 
cheating, which cannot be satisfactorily 
tacked by trust and reputation, and 
which require credible labeling based on 
verifiable procedures and standards.
 Even though studies comparing 
the cost disaggregation in short versus 
long food chains are scarce, the available 
ones show that specialization according 
to comparative advantage and economies 
of scale as regards production, processing, 
and logistics may actually lower the costs 
of food produced at a distance, even in 
terms of energy (Schlich and Fleissner 
2005).
 Besides, centering on 
geographical proximity and advocating 
short food miles (i.e., kilometric distance 
between producer and final consumer—
see Weber and Scott 2008) has been 
criticized for the risk of defensive localism 
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that it may entail (Allen 1999), which 
may come at the expense of developing 
economies (Grolleau, Sirieix, and Schaer 
2010; Kempet al. 2010).
 The first initiatives in the areas of 
organic agriculture and fair trade in the 
1960s “were characterized by a high level 
of vertical integration that went all the 
way from marginalized producers and 
their organizations to dedicated retail 
shops,” involved regular interactions 
between producers and consumers, 
and were based on informal norms 
(Daviron and Vagneron 2011, 97). But 
in the 1980s for fair trade and the 1990s 
for organic agriculture, intermediaries 
between producers and consumers 
turned increasingly professional, formal 
standards emerged, as well as third-party 
certification, enabling these initiatives to 
spread into modern distribution. This shift 
also corresponded to growing consumer 
concerns for food scares and decreasing 
public support for agriculture. In Europe, 
responsibility for food quality control 
has shifted from government authorities 
to industry actors (Wiskerke 2003). Trust 
in persons is shifting increasingly into 
trust in abstract systems, which is “the 
condition of time–space distanciation 
and of the large areas of security in day-
to-day life which modern institutions 
offer” (Giddens 1990, 113).
e. The limits of standards
 Standards are “rules of 
measurement established by regulation 
or authority” ((quotation from Jones 
and Hill 1994) by Reardon et al. (1999)). 
They have been also defined as “norms 
selected as a model by which people, 
objects, and actions ...can be judged and 
compared, and which provide a common 
language to evaluators, the evaluated 
and their audiences”(Ponte, Gibbon, 
and Vestergaard 2011, 1). Standards 
can be classified between performance 
(e.g.,maximum residue limits) versus 
process standards (e.g.,fair trade and 
GlobalGAP); private versus public; and 
mandatory versus voluntary (Reardon 
et al.1999). There are hundreds of 
organic private standards. Standards set 
by the government include 60 organic 
standards, pollution-free, or green 
vegetables for China, etc.
 Labels and standards have 
something to do with trust, but of a 
different kind than inter-personal trust. 
While inter-personal trust is dialogical, 
i.e., it enables a bilateral communication 
and exchange, trust created through 
conformity assessment is monological 
and cannot replace the richness of 
dialogue and experience; standards 
are characterized by opacity (Busch 
2011). “Trust in persons, as Enrikson 
emphasizes, is built upon mutuality of 
response and involvement: faith in the 
integrity of another is a prime source of a 
feeling of integrity and authenticity of the 
self. Trust in abstract systems provides 
for the security of day-to-day reliability, 
but by its very nature cannot supply 
either the mutuality or intimacy which 
personal trust relations offer” (Giddens 
1990, 114). Formal standardization 
comes together with the substitutability 
of suppliers (Daviron and Vagneron 
2011), which inevitably handicaps small-
scale farmers with low assets in terms of 
capital and human skills.
 Besides, standardization and 
certification generate costs that are 
difficult for small-scale farmers to bear. 
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Even though the empirical evidence 
is mixed, it suggests that small-scale 
farmers benefit from formal processes 
of certification only when there is 
government support (or the support of a 
benevolent private trading company with 
genuine concern for local development), 
in particular in terms of training and 
infrastructure, as well as fair contractual 
arrangements (Van der Meer 2006; 
Swinnen 2007; Blackmore and Keeley 
2012).
 Standardization and labeling is 
a partial answer to distrust about food 
safety because it gives consumers the 
responsibility for choices, although it 
does not take their political concerns 
seriously enough (Brom 2000). 
Concerns for food safety are mostly 
of an individualistic nature, but it is 
difficult to disentangle them from more 
collective or societal concerns, such as 
the environmental impact of chemicals 
or Genetic Modified Organisms (GMOs) 
used in food production.
 Hence, the literature suggests 
the following hypotheses: (i) proximity 
in food chains comes low farmers’ cost 
for quality assurance, but also limited 
scope of operation; the impact on 
customers’ trust in food safety is in the 
form of mutual, dialogical trust, but at 
the same time, opportunistic risks are 
not completely dealt with; (ii) “abstract” 
expertise systems that form the basis 
of standardization imply high costs 
at the expense of inclusion of small-
scale farmers, but enable large scope of 
operation and reduction of opportunistic 
risks. The rest of the paper is a preliminary 
attempt to test these hypotheses on the 
situation of vegetable safety assurance 
in Northern Vietnam. We consider here 
quality assurance systems as mechanisms 
of coordination in the chain which 
ensure that quality is delivered according 
to the purchasers expectations (Holleran, 
Bredahl, and Lokman1999; Renard 
2005). 
A preliminary comparative 
analysis of vegetable safety 
assurance systems in Vietnam
Source of data 
The data is drawn from the authors’ work in Vietnam in research and development projects. We focused 
on the following dimensions of vegetable 
safety assurance systems: their costs, 
the degree of interest or commitment 
of farmers (measured by the number 
of farmers involved, the trends in these 
numbers), and consumers’ reliance on 
these systems. We used the results of 
various consumer surveys, in particular 
one conducted in 2006 on 707 consumers 
on the factors determining the perceived 
safety of purchased vegetables, including 
the place of purchase and the nature 
of labeling (Mayer 2007). We also 
conducted focus groups with members of 
the Women’s consumer club. As regards 
the origin of produce in the wholesale 
and retail markets, surveys were made 
at seven times of supply variation, in 
2002 and 2003. A total of 1,369 traders 
were interviewed in 2002, and 1,877 in 
2003 with 180–350 traders surveyed 
each time. Besides we identified all the 
points of sale where vegetables have 
some indication of their safety, e.g., in 
the form of a label on the product, or a 
certificate. Then we carried out cascade 
interviews to trace back the suppliers 
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and the organization of chains up to 
the farmers. We interviewed around 40 
leaders of farmer groups and 30 traders 
to assess their strategies and constraints 
in terms of vegetable safety. Besides, we 
were involved in development projects 
where we supported vegetable quality 
control and by this means had first-hand 
access to information on conditions 
to get quality control in Vietnam. 
This type of data is difficult to get for 
researchers not involved in direct actions 
of quality control. The data presented is 
nevertheless still patchy and need to be 
confirmed by a more systematic protocol 
of data collection. 
The importance of geographical proximity
 Geographical proximity is still 
important in the supply of perishable 
food commodities in Southeast Asia, 
especially for leafy vegetables, which 
play a strong role in the livelihoods of 
the poor, be they farmers or consumers. 
This is due to the high perishability of 
these vegetables, the quality of which 
diminishes after one day. From surveys 
conducted between 2002 and 2005, it 
was determined that leafy vegetables 
originated from less than 50 kilometers 
from the city centers in the capital 
cities of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia 
(Moustier 2007). This is in line with the 
findings of Von Thünen (Huriot 1994). 
Naturally, the situation may change 
with the development of transportation, 
cold chains, and packaging, but these 
innovations may also inflate vegetable 
prices. The geographical proximity 
between producers and consumers 
facilitates short chains, with generally zero 
or one intermediary, between these two 
types of agents. For the mass distribution 
of fruits and vegetables, marketing 
chains are characterized by relatively 
competitive transactions combined with 
personalized relationships. Oligopolies of 
wholesalers–collectors and information 
asymmetries are more frequently 
observed in long-distance than in short-
distance trade. Short-distance trade 
facilitates face-to-face interactions, but 
these were little used for information 
exchange on quality until the last 10 
years.
A variety of quality assurance systems 
 Vietnamese consumers, especially 
urban ones, express growing concern 
for food safety, particularly as regards 
vegetables and fruits (for pesticides) and 
meat (Moustier and Nguyen 2010a). Tests 
on 144 samples of vegetables revealed 
that 12% exceeded the authorized 
limits for pesticide residues (Vietnam 
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of 
Health, and Cida 2009). In response 
to this problem, the government as 
well as farmers and retailers have been 
active in the development of quality 
assurance systems, with varying success. 
The characteristics of quality assurance 
of fruits and vegetables in Vietnam as 
regards costs, nature of trust, and farmers’ 
interests are summarized in Table 1. The 
fieldwork brings to the fore a variety of 
standards and quality assurance systems. 
They have been put in place since 1995 by 
a combination of farmers’ initiatives and 
the support of public administrations 
and international non governmental 
organizations (NGOs): safe vegetable 
(SV) certification by the Plant Protection 
Department (PPD), based on—quite 
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lax—public standards and control; it is 
in some cases supplemented by internal 
control systems; VietGap and AseanGaps 
based on good agricultural practices and 
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point 
(HACCP); and participatory guarantee 
systems (PGSs)for organic vegetables. 
When these three types of systems are 
applied, vegetables are always labeled with 
an indication of the place of production 
and type of certification. As regards 
quality assurance based on relational 
proximity, it is observed that direct sales 
(DS) between farmers and consumers 
develop quickly and are combined with 
certification and labeling relating to safe 
or organic vegetable production. We give 
details below on the operation of the 
different systems.
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Table 1. Systems of quality assurance for fruits and vegetables in Vietnam 
 
 Trust Number of 
criteria 
Cost Farmers’ interest 
Direct sales 
(SVs)  
Mutual  + + 
PPD certification 
(SVs)  
Expert  + 
(100 USD 
per hectare) 
+ 
VietGAP Expert 65 ++ (500–800 
USD per 
hectare) 
− 
GlobalGAP Expert 300 +++ − 
PGS 
(organic 
vegetables) 
Mutual 
+expert 
24 + (<6USD 
per hectare) 
+ 
Direct sales + ICS 
(Internal Control 
System) 
(SVs in Tien Le) 
Mutual+
expert 
 + + 
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a. SV certification by PPD
 In 1995, public interest in the 
safety of vegetable produce led the 
Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (MARD) to 
implement an ambitious program 
called “safe vegetables,” which entailed 
training sessions about Integrated 
Pest Management (IPM), support to 
vegetable marketing by cooperative 
leaders in shops and market stalls, as 
well as subsidized public certification 
of SVs based on analyses of soil, water, 
and produce. NGOs (predominantly 
Agricultural Development Denmark 
Asia—ADDA) also trained farmers as 
regards IPM and later organic vegetable 
production.
 The certification of the SV groups 
by PPD is based on the Ministry of health 
and MARD regulations—the possibility 
to term these regulations as “standards” is 
subject to debate. The regulations indicate 
the authorized and prohibited pesticides, 
maximum residue limits of pesticides 
and fertilizers, content of heavy metal, 
and infection of bacterial pathogens. 
The list of permitted, restricted, and 
banned chemicals in Vietnam is updated 
every year by PPD. The control is based 
on various documents to be issued 
by cooperatives, including a letter of 
commitment to implement rigorously the 
technical procedures and the good use of 
chemicals according to the law, training 
certificates on IPM, list of chemicals used 
in the local area, map of production area, 
and indicating in particular the location 
relative to the sources of water. Besides, 
some samples are collected for chemical 
and heavy metal residue analysis 
along the following modes:  control of 
nitrates, pathogenic microorganism (E. 
coli, Salmonella, Coliform), chemical 
residues (five types decided by experts); 
a minimum of three vegetable samples, 
the timing of which is decided without 
any prior notice to farmers. Unexpected 
inspections are planned by the PPD. The 
certificate is effective for one year. After 
one year, cooperatives have to renew the 
certificate by applying a new request. If 
the cooperatives are found to violate the 
regulations about SV production at the 
time of inspections, they are planned to 
be treated as follows: warning (if first 
and not serious violation); withdrawing 
certificate (if serious and repeated 
violation). This is in the text, but whether 
it is applied or not is unsure. From our 
discussions with cooperative leaders, it 
seems that certificates are renewed in 
many cases without new samples being 
collected.
 In May 2009, in Hanoi province, 
40 units (33 farmers cooperatives, 
representing 6,849 farmers, and seven 
individual firms), held the certificate. 
It had increased by 25% relative to 
three years before. The total certified 
area amounted to 243 hectares (out of 
a total of 12,000 hectares of vegetable 
production). In 2013, 179 units held the 
certificate, including 161 cooperatives 
(information given by Hanoi Plant 
Protection Department). A survey of 121 
consumers of conventional vegetables 
shows that they do not buy vegetables sold 
as “safe,” because they have little trust in 
their safety as the inspections by the PPD 
are suspected (quite rightly) of being 
quite lax. As regards the 104 consumers 
of SVs interviewed in the same study, 
75% have moderate trust in the safety 
of these vegetables (using a scale from 
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1 to 10). There is an indication that the 
number of such consumers will grow as 
73% started buying SVs in the last five 
years (Pham, Mol, and Oosterveer2009). 
It was estimated that vegetables that 
can be identified with PPD certification 
represented less than 5% of the Hanoi 
market (Moustier and Nguyen 2010a). 
But farmers selling through “safe” 
vegetable chains get higher incomes than 
farmers selling through ordinary chains, 
which explain a development of the 
former (Moustier and Nguyen 2010b).
 In summary, PPD certification 
combined with the labeling as “safe 
vegetables” is an expert system which 
is of intermediate cost for farmers, and 
moderately trusted by consumers. 
b. GAP (Good Agricultural Practices) 
Systems
 The more rigorous the 
procedures, the more costly it gets for 
producers or the community group that 
supports them. The current VietGAP 
system of certification for vegetables is 
based on HACCP procedures. It has been 
issued by the Vietnamese ministry of 
agriculture in 2008, based on Aseangaps, 
which have been developed by Australian 
researchers to improve regional trade. 
It requires producers to record their 
practices and to inspect production 
and post-harvest activities (internal 
inspections) according to several food 
safety criteria (the pesticides used, the 
time between treatment and harvesting, 
the place where pesticides are stored, 
the organization of traceability, etc.). An 
external auditor checks these internal 
records using the producers’ registers 
and information from the field. The 
government aims to ensure that VietGAP 
is respected in half of all vegetables—
and tea-producing areas by 2015. A 
total of 65 criteria have to be checked 
in the VietGAP control, which costs 
between 500 and 800 USD per hectare, 
i.e., around 10 times more than the “safe 
vegetable” certification system, which it 
is due to replace. It is also found to be 
very constraining by farmers to record all 
their practices in terms of chemical use. 
Countrywide, in 2011, VietGAP covered 
75,000 hectares for all crops, i.e., 60,000 
hectares for coffee and cocoa, 15,000 
hectares for fruits, tea, and vegetables 
(including 5,000 hectares for dragon 
fruit)(information from the Department 
of crop production of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development). 
In Northern Vietnam, in the same year, 
for vegetables, VietGAP was only used 
by five state-subsidized enterprises and 
three SV cooperatives (information from 
Hanoi Department of Plant Protection). 
This is particularly so because the 
documentation procedures involved in 
VietGAP are rewarded witha low price 
premium (less than 10%) relative to 
vegetables sold as safe (certified or not). 
 GlobalGAP is mostly used by 
private exporters for fish and dragon fruit. 
The problem of incentives for farmers to 
adopt VietGAP or GlobalGAP for dragon 
fruit in southern Vietnam, in a context 
of lax control by importers of what is 
labeled as GlobalGAP, and irregular 
export channels, has also generated heavy 
losses for farmers who have decided not 
to renew their certification. GlobalGAP 
has 300 criteria to be checked and 
costs more than 3,000 USD per hectare 
(Vietnam News 2012). The standards 
set by the Chinese (organic, green, 
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and pollution-free), Thai (Q-Mark), 
and Malaysian authorities (Malaysia 
Best) are reported to have only limited 
adoption (Shepherd and Tam 2008). In 
Thailand, the Royal Project introduced 
GAP and certification for more than 
2,600 mountain horticultural producers, 
but it is still heavily dependent on Royal 
funding, e.g., in terms of packaging, 
control, and marketing (Jayamangkala 
2008). As regards GAP certification for 
pineapple in Thailand, it is adopted quite 
widely, the main factors of adoption 
being the price premium, contracts 
with buying companies and farmers’ 
age. The Department of Agriculture 
monitors farmers’ practices on a regular 
basis and awards GAP certificates 
(Sriwichailamphanet al. 2008). 
 In summary, VietGAP and 
GlobalGAP are costly systems for farmers 
with little development so far. It was not 
possible to evaluate consumers’ trust in 
these systems as vegetables certified as 
VietGAP are little available in the market.
ICS combined with PPD certification 
 In the Superchain project, we 
worked with four groups of vegetable 
farmers in the district of Hoai Duc, 
located in Hanoi Province, which 
represented a total of 140 households. We 
identified as critical points determining 
excesses in pesticide residues the 
type of pesticides used and the delay 
between spraying and harvest. These 
were monitored by farmers themselves 
in a notebook and by a monitoring 
committee made of a group of farmers in 
the cooperative, who checked monthly 
the validity of the records and filled out a 
five-page questionnaire. Noncompliance 
results first in a warning then a sanction 
in the form of excluding the farmer from 
using the group label. This, combined 
with external inspections by a research 
institute accredited by the PPD, enabled 
an 18-member group to obtain VietGAP 
certification in 2005, which was not 
renewed subsequently due to its cost. 
The Internal Control System (ICS) is now 
used as a communication strategy for the 
group in its marketing and it helps them 
to obtain “safe vegetable” certification 
from the PPD. It was interesting to 
note that the effectiveness of recording 
was unequal among producers: from 
30% to 80% for each of the four groups. 
Adoption was higher the younger and 
the more educated the members, and 
the smaller the group (Nguyen 2009). At 
any rate, the internal control system is 
fragile, because it requires a lot of time, 
but farmers do not yet feel the pressure or 
receive incentives from the government 
or the market to sustain this internal 
control system. 
Organic vegetables control 
 Since 1999, organic vegetable 
production is developing around Hanoi, 
following training programs by a Belgium, 
then a Danish NGO (ADDA). In 2009, 69 
farmers of Soc Son district were following 
organic production specifications (which 
have been the subject of a public standard 
in 2008). Twenty-four conditions for 
organic production are included in 
the specifications. An internal control 
system is established and operated by the 
group leaders. The conditions are verified 
in order for Participatory Guarantee 
System (PGS) certification to be issued. 
Until 2010, the certification process was 
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carried out by inter-groups on a monthly 
basis. Inter-groups are comprised of the 
farmer association, a panel of farmers, 
a panel of consumers, and a technician 
from ADDA. The monthly meeting is an 
opportunity to take stock of quantities 
available, PGS certificates issued, disease 
outbreaks, and means of dealing with 
them. It is difficult to determine the 
frequency of inspections upstream 
from getting the PGS certification and 
the makeup of the group of inspectors. 
In practice, consumers do not inspect 
the fields. They declare themselves as 
lacking the competence required to 
evaluate the degree of rigor present in the 
development of safety standards and their 
control. But when the fields are visited at 
different times during the year, they can 
get an idea of the production conditions. 
In 2010, the NGO was performing  a 
number of incidental sample analyses. 
The group leaders were paying 6 USD a 
year for PGS certification. Once a year, 
random samples were taken from four 
families for two types of vegetables. 
These were analyzed using a quick test. 
However, it was difficult to tell whether 
consumers were trusting the PGS system 
or the NGO, since both were mentioned 
on the label, and no survey has been 
conducted to investigate the matter. 
The development of direct sales  
 A final observation relates to the 
recent development of direct sales (or at 
least short, with only one intermediary) 
between producers and consumers, 
especially to promote specific attributes 
of quality, be it in terms of safety or a 
specific geographical location. Nine of 
the 27 cooperatives certified as “safe” 
have developed an efficient marketing 
strategy (Moustier and Nguyen 2010b). 
Of these nine cooperatives, six are regular 
suppliers of supermarkets, and six 
(including three selling to supermarkets) 
have market stalls or shops where they sell 
directly to consumers. An approximate 
total of 500 farmers are involved in these 
cooperatives. All of the nine cooperatives 
are regular suppliers of canteens. 
Compared with the supply of traditional 
markets—which is characterized by 
a chain of collectors, wholesalers and 
retailers—the distribution of vegetables 
labeled as “safe” generally involves zero 
or one intermediary. While direct sales 
represent 60% of the sales of cooperatives 
of SVs, it is less than 10% for conventional 
ones (Moustier and Nguyen 2010a). 
 Direct sales are increasing 
quickly: in 2002, there were 22 points of 
sale for “safe vegetables,” including 20% 
managed by cooperatives. In 2008, there 
were 54 points of sale, 70% of which 
were managed by cooperatives. This 
development is also observed for organic 
vegetables, for which direct sales look 
more sustainable arrangements than 
contract farming as shown by the history 
of the development of the sector. In 2002, 
Hanoi Organics private company was 
distributing organic vegetables via its 
own shop, as well as delivering directly 
to the consumers and to schools. The 
company signed two-year contracts with 
six families of producers in the TuLiem 
district (Hanoi province) and 32 farmers 
in Chuong My district (Ha Tay province), 
specifying the production regulations and 
frequency of controls, while quantities 
and prices were renegotiated every three 
months (they amounted to two to three 
times the prices of ordinary vegetables 
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at producer and consumer levels). In 
2005, the company stopped operating 
because it faced various management 
and logistics problems.
 Since 2008, the NGO “Action for 
the City” has supported a group of 70 
organic vegetable growers (organized 
into eight sub-groups) in Soc Son district 
to provide home deliveries in Hanoi. To 
date, 400 consumers have subscribed, 
and the number is regularly increasing. 
They pay for packs of vegetables delivered 
weekly at stable prices (1 USD per kilo 
for all types of vegetables all year round). 
This NGO is also trying to develop 
participatory certification of organic 
production, based on inspections by 
consumer groups and extension workers, 
and the experience of ADDA. 
 Buying “safe vegetables” from 
producer groups in shops give consumers 
more reassurance because of face-to-
face interactions. Buying vegetables 
from supermarkets also partially 
reassures consumers because they link 
supermarkets with expert systems 
(which is debatable, as supermarkets 
source “safe vegetables” from the same 
sources as shops and the declared 
system of additional sample analysis 
that they perform is quite opaque). 
A survey of 707 consumers in 2006 
showed that the perceived “safeness” of 
vegetables increased depending on the 
location at which consumers purchased 
their vegetables. The least “safe” was a 
spontaneous purchase at an unknown 
market. Trust in “safeness” increased, 
moving from official markets, SV stalls 
and shops, and finally, to supermarkets 
(Mayer 2007). Another survey conducted 
on 801 consumers in Hanoi and Haiphong 
showed that for 60% of the consumers, 
buying from familiar retailers is the best 
way to ensure vegetable safety, while only 
16% rely on certified products (Luuet al. 
2005).
 At the moment, the greatest 
impediment to direct sales in Vietnam 
is farmers’ lack of credit to get access 
to market shops and stalls, all the more 
so because available land is very limited 
in the city. This is less the case in Laos, 
where the authorities have set aside some 
land for a weekly organic farmers’ market 
in Vientiane. 
Results in terms of vegetable safety
 It is difficult to appraise the 
results of different systems of guarantee 
in terms of vegetable safety. First, it 
is difficult to disentangle the effect of 
the system of quality control from the 
effect of production practices. Second, 
high costs are involved in collecting 
vegetable samples and carrying out 
analyses of pesticides, nitrate, and 
heavy metal residues, among others. We 
conducted a study to compare the excess 
pesticide residues in different points of 
sale in 2005. Even though the sample is 
relatively small (250 samples, between 25 
and 70 for each type of points of sales), 
we don’t know of other similar studies, 
which makes the results valuable. 
The sale points chosen include three 
supermarkets, two SV market stalls; one 
organic vegetable shop, two wholesale 
markets, and two retail market spots. 
The sampling was conducted three times 
during the summer of 2005. To detect if 
maximum residue limits were exceeded 
we used quick tests based on Rapid 
Bioassay of Pesticide Residue (RBPR), 
as developed by Taiwan Agricultural 
The Role of Proximity and Standards in Guaranteeing Vegetable Safety in Vietnam
68
Research Institute. The quick test is used 
to screen samples with excess residues 
of carbamate and organophosphorus 
(Ops) pesticides which are the most 
dangerous neurotoxin pesticides. Then 
chromatography (which is more reliable, 
but 20 times more expensive) was used to 
confirm and deepen the evaluation. 
 The results of the study are 
shown in Table 2. No pesticide residue 
was detected in the organic shop. Very 
limited contamination was identified in 
vegetables sold as SVs in supermarkets 
(1%) and in shops (2%). The highest 
residues were found in conventional 
markets, be they formal or informal 
(8% in wholesale markets, 12% in retail 
markets). Hence the results suggest a 
growing vegetable safety when one moves 
from conventional to “safe” and organic 
vegetables.
Conclusions 
The paper highlights strategies by Asian farmers to have their quality efforts rewarded and 
better recognized by consumers for the 
benefit of both. The hypotheses drawn 
from the literature are partly confirmed 
by the fieldwork. The strategy of farmers’ 
getting nearer from the consumer 
stage by integrating marketing stages is 
efficient to reduce uncertainties related 
to food safety and get higher prices. The 
farmer–consumer or farmer–retailer 
relationship is an opportunity to exchange 
knowledge on production methods, 
and this fulfills the purchaser’s need for 
reassurance, as producers are perceived 
as the most competent persons to give 
this information. In turn, direct farmer–
consumer exchanges enable farmers to 
better ascertain consumer demands. 
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Table 2. Summary of pesticide residues found in various points of sale in 2005 
 Supermarkets Wholesale 
markets 
Retail 
markets 
Organic 
shop 
SV stalls 
Total number 
of samples 
75 75 25 25 50 
Number of 
positive 
samples 
1 6 3 0 1 
% of positive 
samples 
1 8 12 0 2 
Source: FAVRI analyses, see Nguyen and Moustier (2006) 
	  
69
Hence the farmer–consumer relationship 
and exchanges enables a partial change of 
credence attributes into search attributes 
(which is also the function of labels 
according to Caswell and Mojduszka 
1996).
 On the other hand, trust cannot 
circumvent all risks of moral hazards. On 
the whole, consumers show a little trust in 
the safety of vegetables supplied to them. 
The vegetable safety analyses show that 
there are indeed excess pesticide residues 
in all types of marketing chains, except for 
organic vegetables. Some form of control 
and certification, based on verifiable 
documentation processes, appears 
desirable to limit opportunistic behavior 
and increase the outreach of quality 
chains beyond local communities. The 
problem with verifiable documentation 
processes is that they add costs and 
constraints to local farmers, and the 
latter are not immediately rewarded 
by consumer premium prices. Table 3 
summarizes the basic characteristics of 
personal interactions and expert systems 
in relation to their ability to assure food 
safety. The illustrations in the paper 
show some success of initiatives based on 
personal interactions in Southeast Asia, 
whereas expert systems are more difficult 
to set up. Some intermediary systems 
combining internal control systems 
with verifiable procedures and external 
inspections—made by consumer groups, 
trading companies, or public bodies—
have been documented as promising 
options. These systems are based on 
relational proximity, expert systems, and 
labeling on the origin of vegetables as 
ways to enhance consumers’ trust and 
farmers’ commitments. One interesting 
outcome relates to the combination of 
systems based on relational proximity, 
expert systems, and labeling on the origin 
of vegetables as enhancing consumers’ 
trust and farmers’ commitments. Hence 
relational proximity, standards, and 
labels are complementary rather than 
substitutes.
 Some recommendations in terms 
of research are now given. 
 First, a more rigorous impact 
assessment of alternative marketing and 
quality control strategies is necessary to 
determine how trust and food safety can 
be strengthened in the chain and at what 
costs and risks for farmers. It implies 
being able to compare, for the same type 
of crops and farmers, different methods of 
controlling food safety: for instance, direct 
sales without ICSs, direct sales with ICSs, 
contracts between farmer groups and 
a consolidator supporting certification 
costs, etc. It also involves panel data, 
treatment, and control samples, which is 
not easy in situations where direct sales or 
certification may represent a small share 
of farms. 
 Second, more action-research 
as well as research in economics, 
management, and agricultural sciences 
are also needed to determine how the 
role of farmer organizations involved in 
ICSs, that of public authorities and that 
of private buyers involved in external 
certification can be combined in a such a 
way that the characteristics of food safety 
as a public good are efficiently tackled at a 
reasonable cost. 
 Third, identifying conditions for 
up-scaling of success stories in terms of 
quality development involving small-
scale farmers is also crucial. This implies 
a more thorough investigation of the 
links between mass and niche markets 
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 Personal interactions Expert systems 
Basis Kinship, neighborhood, encounters Verifiable procedures 
Systems of penalties and 
rewards 
 Mutuality Enforceable commitments 
Scope − + 
Cost for farmers − + 
Vulnerability Limited sanctions against opportunism Lack of skills and rigor 
Rigidity 
Complexity 
Strength Limited sources of opportunism 
Simplicity 
Adaptability 
Replicability 
Supplier 
substitutability 
− + 
Role of public 
sector 
Favoring farmer access to training (on 
production protocols) and market place 
Inspecting farmers and retailers 
practices and product safety 
Favoring farmer access to 
training (on production 
protocols, ICS, contracts) 
Favoring retailer access to 
marketing space 
Inspecting traders’ ICS 
Examples in SE 
Asia 
Vietnam: Direct sales in shops of SVs; 
direct home deliveries of organic 
vegetables 
Laos: Direct farmers’ markets 
SE Asia: VietGAP, 
GlobalGAP, retailer 
certification schemes 
 
 SE Asia: contractual arrangements between farmer groups and 
consolidators with quality and inspection specifications 
Vietnam: SV certification; ICS for SVs in Tien Le and organic 
vegetables in ThanhXuan 
Note: Based on framework set by Giddens (1990) and Daviron and Vagneron (2012) 
 
Table 3. Characteristics of personal interactions versus expert systems as regards 
food safety assurance
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for horticultural products. Assessing 
how temporal interactions between 
stakeholders located at key entry points 
of the chains can compensate for low 
geographical proximity, as suggested by 
Torre and Rallet (2005) is a promising 
avenue of research. 
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